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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants sought to quiet title to six 
(6) acres of property which they previously acquired from 
Davis County on an invalid tax sale. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge Calvin Gould, after considering the extensive 
briefs that were filed by the parties, granted the Respon-
dents' Motion for Summary Judgment on March 3, 1983. The 
Final Order referred to in Appellants' brief was prepared, 
but was never submitted to the Trial Court. Appellants' 
attorney filed the Notice of Appeal (R. 261, 262 Dated March 
31, 1983), with the District Court, but failed to send Re-
spondents a copy. The first Notice the Respondent, Utah De-
partment of Transportation, had of the pending appeal came 
with the Appellants' Designation of the Record which oc-
curred on April 8, 1983. (R. 266,267) The Respondent, 
thinking the appeal time expired on April 3, 1983, prepared 
the Final Order (Appendix A) and sent it to Appellant, but 
in the meantime received the Designation of the Record, and 
consequently did not submit the Final Order to the Court for 
execution. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation, 
Weber and Davis Counties seek to have this Court affirm a 
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Summary Judgment which was granted in their favor which 
quieted title to twelve (12) acres of landlocked property 
which was determined to be located in Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
These Respondents disagree in part with Appellants' 
Statement of Facts and therefore, restates the same. The 
Appellants' statement contains legal argument, wrong cita-
tions and statements in the form of argument without any 
reference to the record where such facts appear. 
Just prior to May 25, 1964, the Third-Party Defendant, 
Robert Dansie (he was a Utah attorney who is now deceased), 
hereinafter referred to as "Dansie," was the owner of ap-
proximately 24.41 acres located near Uintah Junction where 
the Weber River intersects with U.S. Highway 89. The 
property in question, according to the Davis County plat 
maps, was located north of the existing Weber River. (R. 
18) 
In May of 1964, the Defendant-Respondent, Utah Depart-
ment of Transportation, purchased the property in question 
by right-of-way contract (R. 99), and warranty deed from the 
Third-Party Defendant, Robert Dansie. (R. 98) The deed (R. 
98) was recorded in Davis County on June 17, 1964, but Davis 
County only recognized, for recordation purposes, the 
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description in the deed which followed the portion of prop-
erty which was designated "also in Davis County." This par-
ticular description involved a small tract of property which 
in fact, was situated south of the Weber River. The deed in 
question was then later sent to weber County for recorda-
tion. The deed was held by Weber County until September of 
1970, when it finally received a recordation seal. 
The taxes on the property in question were not paid for 
the years of 1964 through 196B in Davis County and conse-
quently, came up for tax sale in May of 1969. (R. 85) Ap-
parently, both Davis and Weber County had been each taxing 
the same property. The parties who purchased the property 
at the May, 1969 tax sale (R. 100), were Thomas Holberg [Rio 
Vista, Involuntary Plaintiff, that default judgment was 
entered against (R. 255, 256)], Ronald Baxter (Plaintiff-
Appellant) and Ronald Toone, (Plaintiff in Civil No. 20915, 
R. 47.) Mr. Baxter (Plaintiff-Appellant) is currently an 
engineer for the Respondent (Utah Department of Transporta-
tion) and was also, at the time he purchased at tax sale the 
property, his employer, the Utah Department of Transporta-
tion, Respondent, had previously purchased from Dansie. The 
facts appear to be that Davis County probably sent tax and 
sale notices to Dansie for the years in question, but the 
Respondent Utah Department of Transportation cid not receive 
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any such notices. Dansie, since he had previously sold the 
property, disregarded the tax notices from Davis County. 
(R. 85) Weber County did not attempt to assess taxes on the 
property in question since they recognized the Respondent, 
Utah Department of Transportation, as the lawful owner of 
the property in question. 
The tax sale purchasers, Holberg (Involuntary Plain-
tiff), Baxter (Plaintiff-Appellant) and Toone (Plaintiff in 
Civil No. 20915), then divided the property, each taking six 
(6) acres and paid taxes to Davis County until 1978. (R. 
113-117) 
In January of 1975, the Defendant-Respondent then 
notified the tax sale purchasers and Davis County of the 
foregoing tax sale and its invalidity. (R. 101-104) 
In August of 1975, a contractor for the Respondent, 
Utah Department of Transportation, LeGrande Johnson Con-
struction Company, entered upon a portion of the 18 acres 
in question and set up a gravel crushing operation. Shortly 
thereafter, one of the tax sale purchasers, Ronald Toone, in 
Civil No. 20915 in Davis County, commenced a damage action 
against LeGrande Johnson Construction Company. 
The foregoing action in Civil No. 20915, resulted in a 
Judgment against the Plaintiff on December 13, 1976. (R. 
106, 107) The Plaintiff, Toone, was represented by Mr. Glen 
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E. Fuller, the same attorney who is now representing the 
current Plaintiffs-Appellants. (R. 106, 107) The Trial 
Court found that the property in question was not located in 
Davis county and therefore, was improperly assessed and sold 
at tax sale. (R. 106, 107) Further, the case was 
tried on the basis of the location of the Weber at the time 
of Statehood. The jury concluded that the Weber River had 
not changed since 1896, which was the critical time for 
determining the boundary line (Weber River), between Davis 
and Weber County. At least 10 maps were shown to the jury 
from 1892 to the present time which established the location 
of the Weber River. Mr. Fuller attempted by parol evidence 
to dispute the 10 maps in question. The Judgment was then 
recorded in Davis County. (R. 106, 107) During the pen-
dency of the action, a Motion to Join the other tax 
sale purchasers (Toone and Holberg) was made to the Court 
which the Plaintiffs opposed and the Court denied. (R. 49) 
As a result of the Judgment, Davis County then 
abated and refunded the taxes which the Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants in the present action, had previously paid. (R. 108, 
109) The Respondent Davis County also marked their plats 
and tax records reflecting that the entire 18 acres in 
question were located in Weber County. ( R. 110) Since 1972 
to the present, none of the three tax sale purchasers have 
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paid taxes on the 18 acres in question and Davis County has 
neither assessed the 18 acres in question nor accepted any 
taxes with respect to it. The current Plaintiff-Appel-
lant, Ronald Baxter, testified as an interested witness on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, Toone, in the Trial of Civil No, 
20915. Mr. Baxter was definitely interested in the outcome 
of the .IQQn.e. case, since his property was located on its 
east boundary. (R. 251) 
The current Plaintiffs in Civil No. 74206, filed their 
Notice of Claim in May of 1978 (R. 111, 112), and their 
Complaint in May of 1979 (R. 1, 2 & 3), in the District 
Court of Davis County. The Davis County Court then granted 
the Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation's Motion 
for a Change of Venue to Weber County. (R. 33, 34, 35, 36) 
The Davis District Court presumptively ruled that the prop-
perty in question was shown to be in Weber County. After 
the case was removed to Weber County, the Defendant-Respon-
dent, Utah Department of Transportation, then filed its 
Answer and Third-Party Complaint. 
The present Plaintiffs-Appellants feel they should be 
allowed to retry the issue of the location of the Weber-
Da\'is County line. The six (6) acres which was conveyed to 
the Appellants lies immediately east of the six (6) acres 
which was involved in the case and just west of the 
-7-
six (6) acres which Rio Vista (Thomas Holberg) acquired, and 
allowed default judgment to be entered against. (P.. 255, 
256) It must be noted that the entire 18 acres in question 
lies north of the Weber River and is bordered on the west 
and north by the Defendant-Respondent's freeway. The entire 
18 acres is both Fhysically and legally landlocked. The 
location of the Weber River determined the boundary between 
the two counties. Since the Plaintiffs-Appellants' property 
lies north of the existing Weber River and depends upon a 
tax sale from Davis County, the issue of the legality of the 
original tax sale has already been determined. The Plain-
tiffs-Appellants feel that 1896 should not be the critical 
time for the determination of the location of the Weber-
Davis County line, but rather the date should be 1866. If 
Mr. Fuller felt the Trial Court in case erron-
eously used 1896, rather than 1866 as the year to determine 
the location of the boundary between Davis and Weber County, 
he should have appealed the decision rendered in the 
case. The Plaintiffs-Appellants have to accept the fore-
going since the evidence is so overwhelming in favor of 
where the Weber-Davis County line (Weber River) was in 1896. 
It must also be noted that Mr. Fuller in the 
filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that 1866 should be 
the critical date instead of 1896. The Trial Court Judge 
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Gould, denied the Motion. 
Judge Gould (\>;ho was the same Judge who tried the 
quiet title action) then required that Weber County and the 
remaining tax sale purchaser, Rio Vista Oil Ltd., (Company 
owned by Holberg) be joined in the present action. (R. 198, 
199) Both Respondents, Weber and Davis County, now join in 
requesting this Court to affirm the Lower Court's decision. 
Weber County filed an answer alleging it wanted nothing to 
do with the present action. (R. 226, 227, 228) Rio Vista 
failed to file any type of responsive pleading and default 
judgment was then entered. (R. 255, 256) 
The Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department of Transpor-
tation then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in its favor 
upon the ground and for the reason that no genuine issue of 
fact remains to be decided and therefore, Judgment should be 
granted in its favor as a matter of law. (R. 84) The Trial 
Court then granted the Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department 
of Transportation's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 249, 
250, 251, 252, 258, 259) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT FOLLOWED PROPER PROCEDURES IN 
GRANTING OF THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
lt appears that Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel has in 
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his arguments attempted to cite all the criteria that 
should be followed in determining when a party should be 
granted a Summary Judgment, but then failed to state what 
facts were in dispute. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states the following: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the m9ving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel is very skillful in ac-
cusing Defendants-Respondents' counsel of only quotins and 
using these facts and documents which support their posi-
tion. At all times during the proceedings of the two cases, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel has been afforded every op-
portunity to object to any facts and/or documents which 
were inadmissable or irrelevent and therefore, should not 
have been considered by the Trial Court. Defendants-Respon-
dents can only submit to this Court that the only real ob-
jection to the documents and facts used are that Plaintiffs-
Appellants' counsel feels the facts and documents are detri-
mental to his clients case, but cannot legally keep the doc-
uments from consideration by this Court. 
On Page 11 of their Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants cite 
an excerpt from a transcript of one of the hearings and 
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the page as 268. The quote is actually containea on page 
274, and came as a result of a hearing wherein Plaintiffs-
Appellants' counsel attempted to cite facts to the Trial 
Court as reasons for allowing an adjoining landowner (Mon-
roe) to intervene in the present lawsuit, when they had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the present lawsuit and with 
Plaintiffs-Appellants invalid tax title. (R. 281) If this 
Court will read the transcript (R. 268-286), it will be 
readily apparent that the disparity existed in the facts as 
they relate to whether Plaintiffs-Appellants should be 
allowed to have an adjoining landowner (Monroe) intervene in 
the present action. The facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants 
are attempting to have this Court believe existed with re-
spect to Monroe, do not pertain to the facts as exist in 
the present action. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel cites only a portion cf 
this Court's decision in Schaer y, UDOT. (No. 18009 January 
10, 1983). The end of the quote reads as follows: 
Where the materials presented by 
the moving party are sufficient to entitle 
hire to a directed verdict [as a matter of law] 
and the opposing party fails either to offer 
counter-affidavits or other materials that raise 
a credible issue [of fact] or to show that he 
has evidence not then available, summary judg-
ment may be rendered for the moving party. 
The Court in the Schaer case upheld the Trial court's 
granting of the Summary Judgment because its ruling was sup-
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ported by uncontroverted facts. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (on Page 13 of their Brief) cite 
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that the Judge " •.. 
afford each party reasonable opportunity to present to him 
information relative to the propriety of taking judicial 
notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be 
noticed." 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel was the attorney of 
record in the case of Toone y. LeGrande Johnson (Civil No. 
20915) and therefore, was intimately familiar with its 
contents. What Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel fails to cite 
are the facts which he feels the Trial Court erroneously 
found to exist or judicially noticed which he now disputes. 
Whether Monroe, as noted above, should have been joined in 
this lawsuit has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues 
raised by this proceeding, i.e., whether the Davis County 
tax sale was valid or not. Monroe's chain of title had 
nothing whatsoever to de with the tax sale in question. (R. 
268-286) 
Any claims of the Plaintiffs-Appellants that deal with 
Defendant-Respondent Weber County should be summarily 
posed of, since they have joined in as a Respondent in the 
present appeal. It is, therefore, fer Plain-
tiffs-Appellants to attempt to raise issues that sclEly Le-
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long to the Respondent, Weber County. 
POINT II 
THE COUNTY BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEll DAVIS AND WEBER 
COUNTY WAS DETERMINED IN THE CASE OF TOONE v. 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY , (DAVIS DISTRICT 
COURT CIVIL NO. 20915) 
On Page 19 of the Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, it 
states there is not a sinsle identical litigant in either 
the present case or the Toone v. LeGrande Johnson case. The 
judgment in the .I..QQn.g_ case (R. 106-107), should readily cis-
close that Davis County, Davis County Commission, Davis 
County Assessor, Davis County Recorder and Robert Rees and 
Marie Grow Dansie, his wife, were all parties to that 
action as well as the present one before this Court. 
It becomes interesting at this point to speculate if 
.I..QQn.g_ had prevailed in his case, whether the present Plain-
tiffs-Appellants would be arguing that the case is not 
dispositive as to the validity of the tax sale in question, 
It would seem logical that Plaintiffs-Appellants would then 
be arguing res judicata, estoppel and judicial notice so 
that they would not have to re-try the same issues that were 
tr ii:·d in the case. 
The important factor at this time for this Court to 
consider is that all of the tax sale purchasers derived 
their title from the original tax sale and tax deed from 
Davis County (R, 100), and were dependent upon the property 
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in question being situate in Davis County. 
One of the facts this Court should consider is that the 
present Plaintiffs-Appellants were given notice of the pen-
dency of the action. (R. 103, 104, 106, 107) In 
fact, as early as November of 1976, the present Plaintiff-
Appellant, Ron Baxter, as well as the Davis County Re-
corder, Davis County Assessor, and Robert Dansie were 
as witnesses who would testify on behalf of the Plaintiff in 
the case. (See attached Exhibit "I") It must be 
noted that although the Respondent, Davis County now joins 
in opposing the Plaintiffs-Appellants' appeal, that it, 
along with Dansie, OFposed the Respondent, Utah Department 
of Transportation in the trial of the case. 
One of the most important facts that emerges from the 
is that the Respondent, Davis County 
changed its plat maps, tax records and refunded any prior 
taxes the Plaintiffs-Appellants may have paid on the six 
acres in question. (R. 108, 1C9, 110) The foregoing was 
done during the year of 1977, and yet the Plaintiff-Appel-
lants failed to state any cause of action in its Complaint 
against the Respondent, Davis County. (R. 1, 2, 3) The Re-
spondent, Davis County then recognized that thE six in 
dispute was located in Weber County and consequentli, the 
tax sale deed under which the Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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their title was void and invalid ab initio. 
On Page 21 of the Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, they 
cite the procedure for changing county lines. The citation 
is totally inapplicable. There was no intent to change any 
boundary lines, but rather the case only served to 
establish where in fact, the county line was between Davis 
and Weber Counties. 
Generally, to raise the defense of res judicata, it re-
quires that both actions must involve the same parties, 
their privities and the same cause of action. An exception 
exists when a person who was not a party is bound by the re-
of the first action where the claim he subsequently 
brings involves the same issue as adjudicated in the 
original action. This doctrine is known as collateral 
estoppel. Idaho State University y. Mitchel y. Bingham 
Mechanical and Metal Products, 97 Idaho 724, 552 P.2d 776 
(1976). The trend of recent cases has approved the fore-
going doctrine. Richards v. Hudson, 26 Utah 2d 1131, 485 
P.2d 1044 (1971). 
The Utah Supreme Court in International Resources v. 
Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 516 (1979) held that "The principle 
which underlies the doctrine ... [of] collateral estoppel, 
is that when there has been a proper adjudication upon a 
controversy, and the Judgment has become final, that should 
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settle the matter and there shculd be no further litigation 
thereon." 
The general standard to use to i[ collateral 
estorpel can be applied tc a particular case was initially 
identified by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard y. 
Bank of Affierica Nat'l Trust and Sayings Assoc., 19 Cal.2d 
807, 122 P.2d (1942). Along with other State Supreme 
Courts, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Bernhard stan-
dard. Wildey. Min-Century Ins. Co .• 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1981); Searle Bros. y. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
In Searle Bros. at 691, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In Bernhard y. Bank of America Nat'l 
Trust & Savings Assoc. the California Supreme 
Court considered the question of the applica-
bility of res judicata as a basis for apply-
ing the collateral estorrel doctrine iden-
tified the following three tests as being deter-
n.inative: 
1. Was the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication identical the 
one presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on 
the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the 
plea is asserted a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication? 
In a subsequent opinion, the California Supreme 
Court recognized the necessity fer a fourth test: 
"Kas the issue in the first case competentli, fully, 
and fairly litigated?" These four tests have been 
adopted by the majority of Jurisdictions as the 
correct standard to apply. 
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Pursuant to the first test of the Bernhard standard, 
the issue presented in the instant case is identical cf the 
issue presenteC in tbe prior action in Civil 20915. In 
both the prior action and the current action the main issue 
was the location of the property in suestion (the entire 
cishteen acres), of which six acres is described in the 
tax sale deed. In the prior action in 
Civil No. 20915, the jury found that the property in 
tion of of the of Section 25, 5 N., 1 W., S.L.M. 
containning 18 acres) was and is located in Weber County; 
therefore, Cavis County improperly assesseC and scld the 
property at the tax sale. 
In the prior action in Civil No. 20915 there was a 
finc:l JUdgrr:ent on the r.:erits. 'l't.is satisfied the second 
test of the Bernhard standard. In the prior action, wit-
nesses on behalf of both parties testified as tc the 
location of the property in question. The current Appel-
lant, Ronald Baxter, testified on the behalf of the previous 
Plaintiff, Toone. A jury was impaneled and on December 16, 
1976, a final judgment against the previous Plaintiff was 
enterec}. (P. 106, 107) 
In the instant case, only the Plaintiffs-Appellants 
be partiel er in privity a party to the prior 
c.ct1or. u. Civil t:o. 20915 to satisfy tbe thirc.J test of the 
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Bernhard standard. Mutuality of parties is not essential 
in asserting collateral estoppel. Bernhard. supra; .\ii.ld..e 
v. Mid-Century Ins. Co •• 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
In Bros .• the Utah Supreme Court provided the 
definition of a person in privity. That Court stated: 
The legal definition of a person in 
privity with another, is a person so identi-
fied in interest with another that he repre-
sents the same legal right. This includes a 
mutual or successive relatiooship to rights in 
property. Our Court has said that as applied 
to judgments or decrees of court, privity means 
"one whose interest has been legally presented 
at the time." .lQ..... at 691. 
Pursuant to the Court's definition of privity in the 
Searle Bros. case, the current Appellants are in privity 
with the prior Plaintiff in Civil No. 20915 because they 
both represent the same legal right, 
The current Appellant, Ronald Baxter, along with the 
prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone, and another purchaser, Thomas 
Holberg. purchased the property in question at the Davis 
County tax sale. The tax deed stated that the current 
Appellant, Ronald Baxter, the prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone, 
and Thomas Holberg (Rio Vista Oil) each owned an undivided 
one-third interest in the property in question. (R, 100) 
Rio Vista Oil and the current Appellants, by qu1t-cla1m 
deeds, conveyed their interest in the westerly six acres of 
the property in question to the prior Plaintiff, Ronald 
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Toone. (R. 113-117) By quit-claim deeds, Thomas Holberg 
(Rio Vista Oil) and the prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone, con-
veyed their interest in the middle six acres of the property 
in question to the current Appellants. (R. 113-118) 
As shown by the conveyances, the current Plaintiffs-
Appellants and the prior Plaintiff in the action in Civil 
No. 20915 are in privity by purchase concerning the middle 
six acres and the westerly six acres of the property in 
qeustion, when they purchased the property in question at 
the tax sale. Therefore, pursuant to the Utah Supreme 
Court's definition of a person in privity with another, the 
current Plaintiffs-Appellants and the prior Plaintiff are so 
identified in interest with the same property of of 
the of Section 25, 5 N. 1 w., S.L.M. containing 18 
acres) as to represent the same legal right. 
In the prior action in Civil No. 20915, the issue was 
the location of the entire 18 acres. The prior Plaintiff 
(Toone), litigated this issue and a final judgment against 
him resulted. The current Plaintiffs-Appellants testified 
as an interested witness at that trial. The current 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' interest in the middle six acres of 
the property in question has been legally represented in the 
action in Civil No. 20915; thus, this satisfied the Court's 
definition of privity in Searle Bros. Therefore, the 
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current Plaintiffs-Appellants must be collaterally estopped 
from litigating the issue concerning the location of the 
property in question. 
Pursuant to the fourth test of the Bernhard standard, 
the issue as to the location of the property in question in 
the prior action in Civil No. 20915 was competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. 
In the prior action, there was a jury trial and the 
issue was heard on its merits.· The current Plaintiffs-Ap-
pellants, Ronald Baxter, was a witness in the prior action; 
therefore, he had an opportunity to contest the issue. 
Also, the current Plaintiffs-Appellants must feel that the 
issue was competently presented because they employed the 
same legal counsel as did the prior Plaintiff. However, the 
existence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the 
issue in the prior adverse action is not the only criteria 
Courts use for the application of collateral estoppel. The 
Court in State Farm Fire & Gas Co. v. Centyry Home Company. 
275 Or. 97, 105, 550 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1976), held 
that: "The Court must also consider the fairness under all 
the circumstances of precluding a party." That Court 
further stated: 
Once the court has concluded that the 
evidence is sufficient to establish that an 
identical issue was actually decided in a 
previous action, "prima facie the first judg-
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ment should be conclusive." The burden then 
shifts to the party against whom estoppel is 
sought to bring to the court's attention cir-
cumstances indicating the absence of a full 
and fair opportunity to contest the issue in 
the first action or other considerations which 
would make the application of preclusion unfair. 
Whether the proffered circumstances and consider-
ations warrant a conclusion that the litigant 
lacked a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate 
the issue and that it would be otherwise "unfair" 
to preclude him from contesting the issue again 
are likewise questions of law. Collateral 
estoppel involves a policy judgment balancing 
the interests of the administration of justice, 
and this court reserves the final word as to 
where the balance is struck in any given case. 
lJh. at 105, 1189. 
In the instant case, the Court must also consider the 
Respondents' burden of relitigating this issue. If the 
Court does not allow the current Plaintiffs-Appellants to be 
collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, the 
Court is then allowing the Plaintiffs-Appellants the unfair 
opportunity of litigating the same issue twice. This would 
result in a waste of the Court's time, as well as the pos-
sibility of inconsistent judgments. 
The Court must find, as a matter of law, that Plain-
tiffs-Appellants have had a fair and full opportunity to 
contest this issue and that they must be collaterally 
estopped from litigating this issue again. Thus, Summary 
Judgment granted in favor of the Respondents should then be 
affirmed. 
POINT Il.l. 
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A PARTY WHO WAS A WITNESS IN A PRIOR ACTION, 
FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH ITS CHARACTER AND OBJECT 
AND INTERESTED IN ITS RESULTS, IS ESTOPPED 
BY THE JUDGMENT AS FULLY AS IF HE HAD BEEN 
A PARTY. 
It is an undisputed fact that the present Plaintiffs-
Appellants appeared as an interested witness in the action 
of Toone y. LeGrande Johnson Construction Co .• et al .• Civil 
No. 20915, and that the Trial Judge in that case was Judge 
Calvin Gould. (R. 128) Also, as shown in the attached 
Exhibit "I", the Plaintiff-Appel[ant, Ronald Baxter, was 
listed as one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses in the 
case. In the Plaintiffs-Appellants own affidavit he 
readily admits furnishing survey information from his 
personal field notes and from government surveys which he 
located and described. All of the foregoing was offered to 
establish the location of the Weber River in an attempt to 
show that in fact the eighteen acres in question was located 
in Davis County. If the foregoing could have been estab-
lished, then the present Plaintiffs-Appellants would be 
making the same arguments as the Defendants-Respondents are 
now making. The current Plaintiff-Appellant, Ronald Baxter, 
was ultimately called upon to render an opinion on the loca-
tion of the Weber River in 1896. The jury in case 
elected not to believe the current Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Ronald Baxter, since they ruled in favor of the Defendants-
-22-
Respondents' agent, LeGrande Johnson Construction Company in 
the .'I.QQD.e case. 
The following cases stand for the proposition that 
where a person who was a witness in a prior action, fully 
acquainted with its character and agent and interested in 
the result, and who might have intervened had he so desired, 
will be bound by the Judgment. Briggs y, Madison. 82 P.2d 
113 (1938); Terry &Jl.Ll..ghl_of Kentucky y, Crick. 418 s.w. 2d 
217 (1967); Security Ins. y. Owen. 501 s.w. 2d 229 (1973); 
MQreland y. Meade, 159 Atlantic 101 (1932); Talbot. et al v. 
Quaker-State Oil Refining CQ......,_ 104 F.2d 967. 
Although this has been mentioned earlier, the current 
title to the three six acre parcels is totally dependent 
upon the validity of the original tax sale title from Davis 
County. Title to the three tracts of property is dependent 
upon a common tax sale title, and upon the existence of the 
same set of facts, i.e., the boundary between Davis and 
Weber Counties. Ipsofacto, a prior Judgment entered with 
respect to the same subject matter operates as an estoppel 
to any right claimed under the original title tax title 
wherein the present Plaintiffs-Appellants was listed as a 
grantee. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 735 Pacific Rail 
road Co. y. U.S .• 168 U.S. 355. 
POINT IY 
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THE COURT MUST TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
ITS PRIOR JUDGMENT IN CIVIL NO. 20915 
AND DECLARE THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' 
TAX DEED IS VOID, AND THUS, AFFIRM SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Carter y. Carter. 563 P.2d 
177, 178 (1977) held: 
It is true that notice may be taken of 
the record of another case. But for this to 
be done it should be so offered in evidence 
by a party, or so stated by the trial court, 
so that it will be known to them what is being 
relied on. · 
Thus, the Trial Court in the instant action must take judi-
cial notice of its earlier judgment in the action in Civil 
No. 20915. (R. 106, 107) 
In the prior action in Civil No. 20915, the jury found 
the property in question if of the of Section 25, 
5 N., 1 w., S.L.M., containing 18 acres) is and always was 
located in Weber County. Subsequently, the Respondent, 
Davis County marked its plats and tax records reflecting 
that the property in question (the entire 18 acres) was and 
is located in Weber County. (R. 108, 109, 110) The Respon-
dent, Davis County then abated the taxes which the current 
Plaintiffs-Appellants had previously paid and ref used to ac-
cept Appellants' checks for any taxes on the property there-
after. The Davis County Credit Memo, (R. 108) reflecting 
the abated taxes to the Plaintiffs, stated that the reason 
for abatement was "Property was determined to be in Weber 
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County by Second District Court. Error of assessment by 
Davis County." Thus, the Respondent, Davis County, who was 
a party in Civil No. 20915, admitted that it had no power to 
tax the property in question. It must follow then that the 
tax deed which the Respondent, Davis County issued to the 
three tax sale purchasers for the property in question was 
void ab initio. 
Article 13, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and 
Section 59-4-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amen-
ded), provides that a County may only tax property within 
its territorial limits. The Utah Supreme Court in several 
cases has held that a taxing authority is required to follow 
procedures prescribed by law with accuracy and particularly 
before it can forfeit one's property. If one step of the 
proceeding is invalid, the tax title is invalid. Salt Lake 
v. Coleman. 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974); 
v. Peterson. 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246 
(1974); Tintic Undine Mining Co. y. Ercanbraclu,. 93 Utah 561, 
74 P.2d 1184 (1938). 
Therefore, the Court must judicially notice that the 
property in question was determined in Civil No. 20915 to be 
in Weber County and that Davis County had improperly sold 
the property in question at a tax sale. Thus, the Court 
must uphold the Lower Court's ruling that the Plaintiffs-
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Appellants tax title to the property in question is void ab 
initio. 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are attempting by this action 
to relitigate issues that have already been previously 
decided. The Weber District Court has already litigated the 
location of the Weber-Davis County line and the validity of 
the tax sale in question. Presently, neither Weber nor 
Davis Counties are now contesting the present location of 
the Weber-Davis County line. The present Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants appeared as an interested witness in the prior pro-
ceeding involving the issues set forth above. To now allow 
the Plaintiffs-Appellants to relitigate issues that have al-
ready been fully and fairly litigated would make a mockery 
of our legal system and the finality of judgments. Con-
sequently, for the reasons as outlined and set forth above, 
these Defendants-Respondents. Utah Department of Transpor-
tation, Weber and Davis County, respectfully request this 
Court affirm the Judgment of the Lower Court. 
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Respectfully submitted this 21st day of June, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
c ( C(c<./( 
WARD / 
Assistint Attorney 
/" 
/ STEV-;; C. -
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
BRENT p. JOHNS / 
Weber County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, postage pre-
paid, to Glen E. Fuller, 678 East South Temple, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, this 21st day of June, 1983. 
/1 
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GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: 363-7187 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD A. TOONE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEGRANDE JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant 
and Third Party Plaintiff, 
PiAINTlFF 'S ANSWERS TO INTERROSA'. 
-vs-
ROBERT REES DANSIE and 
MARIE GROW DANSIE, his wile; 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; 
DAVIS COUNTY ASSEssrn' and 
DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, 
Third Party Defendants 
Civil No. 20915 
COMIS NOW Glen E. Fuller, attorney !or plaintiff in the above entitle 
action, and representing that he is more fully informed. concerning the 1nformat1c 
requested in the Defendant's Interrogatories than is his client, and herewith 
answers the Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY No. 1, State the names and addresses of all witnesses 
the plaintiff intends to call at the forthcoming trial, 
ANSWER: 
Marguente Bourne, Davis County Recorder 
Thayne W, Corbridge, Davis County Assessor 
Ronald Baxter, 3050 East 3020 Soutr,, Sale 1.,akeClty, Utan 
Robert R, Dansie, Third Party Defendant 
Earl Kendell, Morgan, Utah 
Lee B. Rollins, Morgan, Utah 
We have personaJ.ly contacted numerous other md1v1dua1fi in me genera1 
area of Uintah and South Weber, and, depenarng upon the coLUse ot the trial. 
